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ABSTRACT 
Islamic banks are exposed to a unique risk such as Displaced Commercial Risk (DCR). DCR arises from 
the assets managed on behalf of the investment account holders which may be borne by the Islamic 
bank’s own capital, when the Islamic banks forgo part or all of its share of profits on the investment 
account holders funds, in order to increase the return to the investment account holders. In a dual 
banking system, DCR could be a threat to the Islamic banks given the competition of fixed and higher 
return from the conventional banks. However, DCR would not be a threat to Islamic banks if their 
account holders choose Islamic banks due to religious obligatory factor. This paper aims to examine 
whether DCR is a threat to Islamic banks’ stability. For that purpose, a model is set up to estimate 
bank stability. The model includes other bank specific characteristics and macroeconomic variables 
as control variables to avoid omitted variables bias. We find that DCR is one of the factor that affects 
bank profitability, at least in the case of Malaysian Islamic banks. This empirical evidence implies 
that Islamic banks operating in a dual banking system are affected by displaced commercial risk. 
Hence, it should be one of the banks’ risk management concern 
JEL classification: C23; E30; G21. 
Keywords: Islamic banks; Z-score; Displaced Commercial Risk; bank stability; investment account 
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Introduction 
The ideas of risk existence in the Al Quran surah Al Baqarah verse 155 and Ali Imran 
verse 142. Allah says that: …And We will surely test you with something of fear and hunger 
and a loss of wealth and lives and fruits, but give good tidings to the patient… (Al-Baqarah: 
155) and …Or do you think that you will enter Paradise while Allah has not yet made evident 





These verses explains that discussion how we can achieve the ideal having in mind the 
uncertainty and risks involved in everyday life. The uncertainties leading to loss is called risk 
based on the situation that involves the probability of deviation from the path that leads to 
the expected or usual result. The present verses also bid the protection of human life and 
property and forbid any uncalled for intrusion into that area whether those human beings 
are men or women, related or unrelated, Muslim or non-Muslim with whom there is a no-
war pact in force. (Tafsir al-Mazhari) 
The issue goes to the heart of Islamic banking and finance. Two basic principles of the 
Islamic bank are the avoidance of interest, for fear it may lead to the sin of usury; and 
avoidance of risk, which could be interpreted as gambling, which is also forbidden. So 
Islamic financial instruments have to be constructed on the foundations of real physical 
assets, in which the participants are profit-sharing partners. There is nothing wrong in Islam 
with profit, but it must be profit from the income from tangible assets.  
Almost all financial institutions in Malaysia have fully adopted Islamic banking which is 
the provision and the use of financial services and products offered that conform to Islamic 
principles (outlined in the Quran and Islamic law). Banks remain the core of the financial 
services industry since they account for the bulk of financial transactions and their 
soundness is of key concern for stability. In Islamic banking, the contract-based regulatory 
framework will also contribute towards advancing the goals of financial stability which seek 
to preserve a financial system that works effectively and efficiently to serve real economic 
activity. 
Like the conventional financial institutions, the operations of Islamic banks also face 
some financial risk problem. In the Malaysian environment, potential risks to financial 
stability will mainly be from a general weakness in the external economic conditions. The 
Malaysian financial sector is well placed to cope with external developments by ensuring 
the healthy economy and sustainable growth. The existence of unique risks in Islamic banks 
arise both from the contractual design of instruments based on shariah principles and the 
overall financial infrastructure. One of the risk that is unique to Islamic banking, that is the 
interest of this paper is Displaced Commercial Risk, (DCR).   
Displaced commercial risk illustrates the situation where equity-holders have to transfer 
(or sacrifice) a part of their profit or incur a portion of depositors’ loss to avoid deposit 
withdrawal (Abedifar P. et al., 2013). DCR is also the risk of transfers from shareholders’ 
funds for the purpose of the smoothing of investors’ returns1 (Andrew, 2004). It means that 
DCR is relates to the fact that Islamic banks may find themselves under pressure to smooth 
the rate of return of the Profit Sharing Investments Accounts (PSIA) in order to remain 
competitive and not lose customers. In addition, the actual return of PSIA would be 
subsidized by shareholders’ profits (Christos & Alexandros, 2009). According to How et. al 
(2005), DCR should be a concern to the Islamic banks, particularly in a dual banking context 
such as in Malaysia. 
                                                          
1 Smoothing Mechanisms are (For further details, refer to IFSB, 2010): a) Usage of prudential reserves; b) 
Adjusting the mudarib share; and c) Transfers from shareholders’ funds. 
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For instance, usually this risk (DCR) is a result of rate of return risk. This occurs when 
Islamic banks invest funds in Murabahah or Ijarah assets which yield lower rate of return 
compared to the current expectations of Investment Account Holders. Although in theory 
IIFS are not obligated to carry out such income smoothing, they may find that due to 
supervisory authority or commercial pressure, they are virtually forced to do so (Haron & 
Hin Hock, 2007).  
Consequently, under commercial pressure, the majority of Islamic banks to smooth the 
rate of return attributed to their Investment Account Holders at the expense of profits 
normally attributed to shareholders, in order to offer them a competitive remuneration 
and persuade them to keep their funds in the bank (Khan & Ahmed, 2001; Archer and 
Karim, 2006). 
In Islamic banks, a study conducted by Khan and Ahmed (2001) finds that the DCR is the 
most critical risk faced by the Islamic banks compared to other risks such as the operational 
risk and liquidity risk. The reasons for considering DCR as the most important may be 
because the risk of facing a lower rate of return on assets than currently expected by 
investment account holders. Therefore, increasing the share of profit sharing investment 
account (PSIA) that could arise in period of economic recession and loss of competitiveness. 
DCR also is harder to manage since it too depends on other banks’ decision.  
Towards achieving this, this paper seeks to answer the questions of whether DCR 
presents a threat to the stability of Islamic financial institutions. In other to answer that 
research question; First, DCR date series is calculated using Value at Risk (VaR) method. 
Second, using standard panel data estimation, the impact of DCR on stability is estimated. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents some of 
discussion the DCR. Section 3 present data and methodology. We present empirical results 
in section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
Displaced Commercial Risk (DCR) 
Displaced commercial risk is an unexpected losses that the bank is able to absorb to 
ensure that Investment Account Holders (IAH) are remunerated at a competitive rate 
(Toumi, 2010). Inspired by Rosly and Zaini (2008), Sundararajan (2008) and How et. al 
(2005), in competitive pressures on bank to attract and retain investors (fund providers), 
Islamic banks as mudarib may forgo up their rights to part or their entire mudarib share in 
profits in favor of Investment Account Holders (fund provider) is a commercial decision. 
Displaced commercial risk indicates that the bank may operate in full compliance with 
the shariah requirements reflected bank may not be able to pay competitive rates of 
returns as compared to other competitors. This risk arises when an Islamic bank is 
underperform during a period and is unable to generate adequate profits to pay its 
investors depositors a rate of return higher than what should be payable under the actual 
terms of the investment contract (AAOIFI, 1999; Khan and Ahmed, 2001; Van Hennie and 
Iqbal, 2008). The reasons for this are quite clear in the Islamic bank environment. If bank 
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do not provide rates similar to deposits, then investment account holders will move their 
funds to a bank (Islamic or otherwise) that does define displaced commercial risk. This is a 
legitimate concern and it relates to the mentality of investment account holders who may 
desire a stable low-risk return. 
Therefore, in reality, most of Islamic banks decide to waive their profit portion to pay 
the investment account holders (IAHs) in order to prevent the withdrawal of the IAHs. An 
Islamic bank is strongly exposed to massive withdrawal risk due to lower rate of return on 
investments deposits, which explains the logic of increasing the profits distributed to IAHs 
(Khan and Ahmed, 2001; Ahmed, 2003; IFSB, 2005; El-Hawary et al., 2007). Once it occurs 
and cannot be handled properly, Islamic banks may go bankrupt or at least be taken over 
by government (banking authority). To prevent withdrawal from their depositors, the 
owners of the bank will need to apportion part of their own share in profits to the 
investment depositors. As a result, some Islamic banks give minimum guaranteed returns 
to depositors, although it is prohibited by the shariah principles (AAOIFI, 1999; Warde, 
2000). 
Thus, Archer and Karim (2006) argue that DCR is potentially an efficient and value 
creating means of sharing risks between two classes of investor with different risk 
diversification capabilities and preferences. Therefore, Islamic banks set up two standards 
of practices reserves with the intention of minimizing any need to forgo management fees. 
According to Greuning and Iqbal (2007), Islamic banks introducing Profit Equalization 
Reserve (PER) and Investment Risk Reserve (IRR) is to compete with conventional banking 
industry, it is a shield used by Islamic banks to protect DCR. Besides that, Central bank of 
Malaysia (BNM, 2004) issued Framework of Rate of Return to aid Islamic banking sector to 
mitigate risk of income destruction by sustains comparable rates of return for fund 
depositors. 
It means that DCR is related to the fact that Islamic banks may find themselves under 
pressure to smooth the rate of return of the Profit Sharing Investments Accounts (PSIA) in 
order to remain competitive and not lose customers. In addition, the actual return of PSIA 
would be subsidized by shareholders’ profits (Christos & Alexandros, 2009).  
Further, the issues of DCR which arise as a result of the risk characteristics of profit-
sharing investment accounts (PSIA), the main source of funding of Islamic banks in most 
jurisdictions. The characteristics of PSIA in Islamic banks could vary among banks and 
jurisdictions, from being deposit-like products (fixed return, capital certain, all risks borne 
by shareholders) in some, to being investment-like products (variable return, bearing the 
risk of losses in underlying investments) in others. Depending upon the extent to which the 
balance sheet risks get shifted from investment account holders to shareholders through 
various techniques available to Islamic banks’ management. Such as, in Islamic banks, the 
tenor of unrestricted PSIA may be shorter than that of Islamic financing assets. When 
market rates of return rise, unrestricted IAH expect their returns to keep compete, while in 
the absence of repricing, the assets of bank are effectively occur. These market pressures 
have the effect of displacing onto shareholders’ investment risks on IAH funds which, from 
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a purely shariah point of view, would be borne entirely by the IAH. In other words, these 
pressures give rise to DCR.  
In summary, we can see: First, how various authors define DCR. Second, how Islamic 
banks work to make the decision in order to prevent the withdrawal of the IAHs. Third, how 
the market operation are related to DCR. In Islamic banks, the target market is likely to be 
sensitive to market based price measures, particularly if these banks operate in competitive 
contractual environments with other Islamic and conventional banks and deposit taking 
institutions. As a result, Islamic banks may be pressured in varying degrees to provide 
distributions similar to other institutions or risk losing their depositor base. This risk has 
been termed displaced commercial risk. It essentially refers to the risk that investors will 
withdraw their funds in droves, thereby subjecting the bank to failure, if the returns paid 
demonstrate a trend contrary to the investors’ expectations of deposits of a similar nature. 
Next section provides a step practical procedure for the estimation of DCR. 
Under a dual banking system, the stability of interest rates and the financial system is 
of great importance for the policy maker in developing the Islamic banking industry. Islamic 
banks are not remote from the interest rate volatility. It is the displaced commercial risk 
that threatens Islamic banking stability in a changing market interest rate situation 
(Hutapea and Kasri, 2010). This mainly arises from the risk faced by Islamic banks in the 
liabilities side, as a result of the mobilization of deposits which are on Mudharabah basis. 
IFSB (2005) define the displaced commercial risk as: “… the risk arising from assets managed 
on behalf of Investment Account Holders which is effectively transferred to the Islamic 
Financial Institutions own capital because the Institution forgoes part or all of its mudharib’s 
share (profit) of on such fund, when it considers this necessary as a result of commercial 
pressure in order to increase the return that would otherwise be payable to Investment 
Account Holder’s” (IFSB, 2005).  
Inspired by Rosly and Zaini (2008), he derives DCR from competitive pressures on bank 
to attract and retain investors (fund providers). The decision of bank to give up their rights 
to part or their entire mudarib share in profits in favor of Investment Account Holders (fund 
provider) is a commercial decision. Furthermore, Sundararajan (2008) point out that 
exposing Islamic bank to displaced commercial risk, where Islamic bank as mudarib forgoes 
part or all of its share of profits and passes these to the customer, commonly to match the 
investment yields offered by competitors in the market. Some comparisons may also be 
made with interest rate levels offered by conventional banks. 
The consequence of such smoothing is that a prudential regulatory framework for a 
product that is not treated consistently or according to theory across the industry. In an 
attempt to provide a degree of regulatory certainty, the guidelines issued by the Accounting 
and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institution (AAOIFI) with the 
implementation of a displaced commercial risk charge provide an attempt to cushion this 
risk. A more sophisticated approach to dealing with displaced commercial risk from a capital 




Whereas, according to Van Hennie and Iqbal (2008), the AAOIFI  has identified the 
displaced commercial risk as the risk when an Islamic bank is underperform during a period 
and is unable to generate adequate profits to pay its investors depositors a rate of return 
higher than what should be payable under the actual terms of the investment contract 
(AAOIFI, 1999). Archer and Karim (2006) argue that displaced commercial risk is potentially 
an efficient and value creating means of sharing risks between two classes of investor with 
different risk diversification capabilities and preferences.  
Therefore, an Islamic bank is strongly exposed to massive withdrawal risk due to lower 
rate of return on Investments Deposits, which explains the logic of increasing the profits 
distributed to Investment Account Holders (Khan and Ahmed, 2001).  
In other words, DCR is the transfer of the risk associated with deposits to equity holders 
(Ahmed, 2003 and IFSB, 2005) or the risk of divergence between asset performance and 
the expectation for return on liabilities2. This risk is one of the triggering factors of 
withdrawal risk where the bank is exposed to the risk of deposit withdrawals from their 
depositors (El-Hawary et al., 2007). 
Once it occurs and cannot be handled properly, Islamic banks may go bankrupt or at 
least be taken over by government (banking authority). To prevent withdrawal, the owners 
of the bank will need to apportion part of their own share in profits to the investment 
depositors. As a result, some Islamic banks give minimum guaranteed returns to depositors, 
although it is prohibited by the shariah principles (AAOIFI, 1999). 
As such, the Islamic banks may decide to waive their rights to part or their entire 
mudarib share of profits in order to satisfy and retain their fund providers and dissuade 
them from withdrawing their funds. Hence, confirms the previous finding of Mangkuto 
(2004). Taken together, these results suggest that the Islamic banks are exposed to various 
banking risks which will inevitably affect the bank margin. 
An Islamic bank engages in such self-imposed practice to induce its investment account 
holders not to withdraw their funds in the bank to invest them elsewhere. Hence, during 
bad times the bank may forgo part or all of its shareholders’ profits, and this may adversely 
affect its own capital. An example is the International Islamic Bank for Investment & 
Development in Egypt, which distributed all of its profits to investment account holders 
while the shareholders received nothing from the mid to late 1980s3 (Warde, 2000). 
Further, as the level of Islamic deposit decreased when interest rate increased, the 
banks are also exposed to displaced commercial risk. In Islamic banking literature, the 
displaced commercial risk occurs due to market pressure that Islamic bank pays a return 
that exceeds the rate that has been earned on assets financed by investment account 
                                                          
2 In bank institutions, can split into two parts: bank and shareholders. Firstly, in bank institutions: Displaced 
commercial risk may adversely affect the value of the bank’s capital. Return on equity goes down. Secondly, 
shareholders are exposed to the risk of not receiving their share of the bank’s profit. 
3 In 1988, the bank distributed to its depositors an amount exceeding its profits, and the difference appeared in the 
bank’s accounts as “loss carried forward”. It is also reported that this bank was subject to temporary takeover by 




holders when the return on assets is under-performing as compared with competitors’ 
rates.  
Thus, in order to assess the DCR, the idea of DCR have been analyzed empirically in 
Archer et.al (2010) and Toumi et.al (2011) measured by a Value at Risk methodology. The 
evidence reveals a significant amount of return smoothing, and a significant absorption of 
risks by bank capital. This finding raises a broader issue of how best to measure empirically 
the extent of risk sharing between unrestricted investment accounts and bank capital. 
Summarizing, DCR exposure in Islamic banks which requires allocating adequate capital. 
Under commercial pressure or regulatory pressure, the majority of Islamic banks absorb a 
proportion of losses normally borne by Investment Account Holders in order to mitigate 
potential massive withdrawal of funds. Note that if the banks are forced to give part of their 
profit share to fulfill the consumers’ expectation and stay competitive in the market, this 
could suggest a poor risk management practices which increase their operational expenses 
and reduces their profit margin. Based on the empirical evidence, a methodology for 
estimating DCR can be measured by value at risk (VaR). Next section provides a step 
practical procedure for the estimation of DCRVaR and the impact of DCR on Islamic bank 
stability.  
 
Data and Methodology 
Data Inputs  
This research will use a sample of 17 full-fledged Islamic banks in Malaysia. The study 
periods span from 1994 to 2012, using a balanced panel data of 323 observations. Our 




DCR occurs when recognized the rate of return was lower than expected rate of return. 
It is meant as a potential loss when the shareholder funds used to smooth rate of return on 
Islamic deposits. With this, there is a potentiality that customer might switch from Islamic 
deposits to conventional deposits especially in dual banking system.  
Some of the Islamic banking depositors position the banks indifferently from the 
conventional ones, namely rational depositors. For example, when Islamic banks offer 
deposit products to depositors, the revenue sharing rate of Mudarabah deposit contract 
should be attractive enough. It is because there is a level of tolerance among depositors to 
value the return of Islamic deposits which is defined as the difference between the 
depositors expected rate of return of depositing money in conventional deposits and the 
Islamic deposit return from Islamic financing. Normally, depositors expect to earn a higher 
return from Islamic deposits than from conventional ones.  
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Therefore, if  
e c e i nr D r D    
When the e c
r D
is less than e i
r D
, a DCR might not occur or n

    
Where; 
e cr D  The Conventional Deposit Return 
e ir D   The Islamic Deposit Return 
n    A level of tolerance among depositors to value  
In the case of  
e c e i nr D r D    
When the e c
r D
is higher then e i
r D
, a DCR might occur or n

  
In order to determine the DCR, assuming a normal probability distribution, and using 
the standard deviations of rate of return on equity (ROE), the equations can be shown 
through estimation model proposed by IFSB (2011) as follows: 
                           1 0
DCR UL UL 
         (1)    
Where; UL0 is a multiple of the standard deviation of ROE0 (Unexpected loss to 
shareholders when PSIA are treated as pure investment products) and UL1 is a multiple of 
the standard deviation of ROE1 (Unexpected loss to shareholders when PSIA are treated as 
being in between pure investment and deposit like products). The corresponding 
unexpected loss to shareholders under the two scenarios of PSIA can be calculated as the 
rate of return to equity is expressed as follows: 
                                   0
ROE RA PA 
  (2) 
                 
 
 1 . . m
RA PA DI
ROE




         (3)  
Where; RA is the gross rate of return on assets; PA is the provision as a percentage of 
assets; DI is PSIA funds; K is shareholders’ funds; Rm is mudarabah income; and w is the 
weight attached market benchmarks in the decision on payouts to IAH. 
 
DCR Value at Risk (VaR) Method 
Value at Risk (VaR) is one of the risk management tools. The VaR indicates how much a 
bank can lose or make with a certain probability in a given time horizon. VaR summarizes 
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financial risk inherent in portfolios into a simple number. Though VaR is used to assess the 
DCR is an appropriate method to measure effectively the capital charge for this risk. We 
outline the underlying concept of DCRVaR method of estimating it. VaR is well-known in 
financial mathematics and has become a standard risk measure for financial risk 
management due to its conceptual simplicity and ease of computation. Nevertheless, VaR 
has been charged as having several conceptual problems (Jorion, 2007, Yamai and Yoshiba, 
2005, Artzner et al., 1999). 
To assess the DCR based on Value at Risk (VaR), we want to know the bank equity 
amount necessary to absorb the displaced commercial risk. In spite of the existing reserve 
level, the return on investment can fall below the benchmark level. The equity level 
uncovered by the reserve amount will be obtained by the VaR for a given probability level 
α. The estimation DCR equation from equation (1) will become (4) after implementing VaR 
method. If the investment and benchmark profit follow the standard normal law and 
isolating the VaR it comes: 
   ( ) ( )VaR i b i bDCR Z r r E E r E r                    (4)                                                                                 
This model adapted from Toumi et.al (2011), where; 
Z is a quantile of the standard 
normal law for the level of probability  . i
r
is the return on the investment account. E is 
the part of accumulated amount of reserve attributed to Investment Account Holders and 
br is a return on benchmark. 
Now, this study do it value of VaR in the percentage amount in DI. It is making easier to 
interpret VaR value. By developing the standard deviation (volatility) of the difference 
between the investment and benchmark profit, the VaR is using by the capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM) model. In the simplest case were the benchmark portfolio is the risk free 
asset and the invested portfolio is equal to the market portfolio, the VaR becomes: 
     ( ) 1VaR m m f f
DCR
f Z R E R R E f R
DI

       
          (5) 
 
The Impact of DCR on Bank Stability 
In this section, we describe the methodology that is used to estimate the impact of DCR 
on bank stability. We consider the z-score as a measure stability of Islamic banks because 
it combines banks’ capital and profits with the risk they face in a way that is grounded in 
theory. 
Using standard panel data estimation, the impact of DCR on bank stability is estimated. 
To ensure robust result, other factors that could possibly influence bank stability such as 




The general estimation model can be specified as follow: 
, , , ,i t i t i t i tBS bc m                 (6) 
Where the dependent variable is the ,i t
BS
is bank stability for bank i at time t, bc is a 












Where, K is equity capital as a percentage of assets, µ is average return as percentage 
of assets, and σ is standard deviation of return on assets as a proxy for return volatility. 
Precisely, BS indicates the number of standard deviations that a bank’s return on assets has 
to drop below its expected value before equity is depleted and the bank is insolvent 
(Mercieca, Schaeck, and Wolfe (2007); Cihak and Hesse (2010)). Thus, a higher z-score 
indicates that the bank is more stable. 
 
Determination of Model 
Bank stability estimation model is used to capture the relations between bank stability, 
DCR, bank characteristic and macroeconomic variables. Equation (7) will be estimated and 
examines the impact of DCR on bank stability with bank specific characteristics as the 
control variables includes macroeconomic variables in addition to bank specific 
characteristics. 
, 0 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 ,   i t i i t i t i t i t i t i t i tBS ROA AST OWN LOAST LPLO DIV COST              
 
             8 , 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 , 13 , ,i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
DCR EXCH INFL GDP INT HERFIN            
 (7) 
Where BS is used as a proxy measure of the banking stability; ROA is return on asset as 
a proxy of profitability; AST is total assets of a bank as a proxy of size; OWN is the ownership 
as a proxy of dummy variable. Assume the value of (1) if the bank is a local Islamic bank and 
(0) is a foreign Islamic bank in Malaysia. The dummy variable (OWN) is comprised to detect 
whether there are efficiency differences between local Islamic bank and a foreign Islamic 
bank banks operating in Malaysia; LOAST is ratio of loans to total assets; LPLO is the ratio 
of loan loss provisions to total loans is incorporated as an independent variable in the 
regression analysis as a proxy of credit risk; DIV is the Income Diversity proxies by a measure 
of diversification across different sources of income; COST is cost to income ratios as a proxy 
of cost efficiency; and DCR is displaced commercial risk as a proxy of risk factor; EXCH is the 
exchange rates; INFL is the inflation rate; GDP Gross domestic product; INT is the interest 
rate ratios; HERFIN is the Herfindahl index, defined as the sum of squared market shares (in 
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Based on the sample above, we present empirical results of DCR model between 1994 
to 2012. Figure 1 (In Appendix) detail the trend of capital required by Islamic Banks in 
Malaysia to cover the displaced commercial risk ratio at 99% confidence level. 
The figure expresses DCR performance between 1994 to 2012. In overall, since 1994 to 
2008, there is a sharp increase DCR for each Islamic bank. This situation occurs on bank 
since pressures from regulators on each Islamic bank to pay market related returns and 
avoid any loss of principal, in order to prevent possible risks that might arise from customer 
withdrawals from banks that offer below market returns. The crisis also revealed a 
structural weakness in Islamic banking operations particularly under a volatile economic 
environment. In Malaysia, 90% of Islamic financing are negotiated on fixed-rate terms. 
Comparatively, the return from financing under Islamic banking would decline under this 
environment and contribute to lower deposit rates to depositors. In essence, Islamic 
banking could not react swiftly under the current interest rate environment due to the 
absence of a floating rate option.  
Generally, starting in 1999, all banks need the huge capital to cover the displaced 
commercial, which is the average capital required by this year to cover the displaced 
commercial risk (DCRVaR) is 0.13 of the total of investment account. It happened since the 
impact of interest rate changes on Islamic bank performance in the dual system. The Islamic 
banks are exposed to interest rate risks and the cause of this phenomenon is the 
overdependence of Islamic banks on Islamic financing where the profit rate (financing rate) 
is fixed. When interest rates are rising, the base lending rate (BLR) and rates of return on 
deposits of the conventional bank would change accordingly to changes in the market 
interest rate. As a result, the profit margin of the conventional bank will not be affected. 
However, the Islamic bank cannot increase the rate of returns on its deposits because the 
profit margin is fixed. As a consequence, Islamic deposits give lower returns. The 
substitution effect comes into play where depositors prefer the conventional banks. In 
2002, the average amount of DCRVaR climbed gradually to just over 0.50. This risk amount 
has fluctuated between 2002 to 2008, before ending at a peak of average 7.64 in 2008. 
Such a phenomenon of economic recession and loss of competitiveness is one of the 
reasons why the banks expose higher DCR.  
There was a steep fall in capital to cover the DCR by the end of the year 2009. The result 
shown that the performance of the Islamic banking in Malaysia had improved during the 
period. With Malaysia’s goal of becoming the most significant Islamic finance hub in the 
world, it is therefore very important to Islamic banks improve the asset quality and maintain 
the proportion IAH in reserve within the IAH equity, with the purpose of smoothing returns 
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to IAH. Therefore, at the end 2012, the average amount of the capital required by each 
Malaysian Islamic banks to cover the DCR is 4.26 of the total of investment accounts with 
99% confidence. We find that, where based on the data used in this regression, an 
additional year of DCR, insofar as the effect of DCR is still in small amount. However, the 
equity of Islamic banks is still needed to protect DCR. 
 
Bank Stability results 
Descriptive analysis was conducted to observe the statistical properties of the data used 
as variables, such as the mean, median, standard deviation and normality of the data. Table 
1 illustrates the summary of basic descriptive statistics of the variables involved in the 
model developed, based on two main indicators, namely the indication of bank 
specification and macroeconomic factors.  
According to Table 1, we can see that the variables such herfindahl index, displaced 
commercial risk, interest rate ratios and inflation rate are recorded the highest average 
value in the data distribution with mean values are 7.52, 2.41, 4.08 and 2.73 respectively. 
Meanwhile, return on asset and the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans variables 
show the lowest average value of 0.0149 and 0.0240. Throughout this study, Malaysian 
Islamic banking proves their market power strength. This is shown by the higher average 
herfindahl index (HERFIN) value. Islamic banks also trying to further strengthen risk 
management. This was reflected by the finding on higher DCR average value. In terms of 
macroeconomics, growth of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) averaged 9.34 and the 
exchange rates (EXCH) during 1994 to 2011 at 6.61. The level of average Z-score remained 
stable at 0.67. While total assets of a bank (AST), ratio of loans to total assets (LOAST) and 
cost to income ratios (COST) have a strong average explained some bank characteristic 
factors.  
Next, standard deviation is used in determining the variation of the data. COST variables 
have the highest standard deviation value of 3.91. This shows that the Islamic banking 
involved in the research do not consistently store cost to income ratios. Small data 
dispersion exists for the gain (ROA) variable. For the macroeconomic variables, the highest 
data dispersion is the interest rate ratios (INT) variable with a value of 1.81, while the lowest 
dispersion value is growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) with a standard deviation of 
0.07.  
In measuring skewness, it is found that the bank characteristic variables, which consist 
of cost to income ratios (COST) and the Herfindahl index (HERFIN), have a negative 
scattering data. In contrast, the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans (LPLO), total 
assets of a bank (AST) and displaced commercial risk (DCR) were positively scattered. Next, 
macroeconomic variable such as growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) recorded 
negative scattering data, while the data on the exchange rates (EXCH), inflation rate (INFL) 
and the interest rate ratios (INT) variables are positively scattered. 
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Next, kurtosis tests were carried out to observe the normality of the data distribution. 
The inflation rate (INFL), Income Diversity (DIV) and the Herfindahl index (HERFIN) kurtosis’ 
values are approaching two, meeting the criteria for a normally distributed data. 
Jarque-Bera test is then used to confirm the extent of the data normality distribution. 
From this test, results in Table 1 demonstrate that all variables are significant. This shows 
that all data are not normally distributed. Therefore, ordinary least square (OLS) estimation 
is not compatible with the research data. Hence, the Generalized Least Square (GLS) 
method is more appropriate and expected to yield a much better result. 
The method to test the existence of multicollinearity is by checking the Pearson 
correlation between the independent variables, which can lead to biased results. 
Correlation analysis is a simple method to detect the existence of collinearity in a multi-
variable data based on the variables’ correlation matrix. It can test and measure the degree 
of strength (absolute value) of the relationship between dependent and independent. 
Correlation analysis can also be used to determine the type of relationship or the direction 
of the figure, whether it is moving from left to right or vice versa. Thus, a relatively high 
correlation value between the two independent variables indicates the possibility of a 
multicollinearity happening. 
Table 2 shows the correlation matrix for the independent variables. Based on the 
correlation table, it seems that all independent variables have significant correlation with 
stability variables except the (GDP), (OWN), and (COST) variables. Variable (INFL) and (INT) 
have significantly strong negative values with stability indicating that the greater amount 
of the inflation and interest rate the economic have, the lesser their amount of stability. 
Most of the variables are correlated but not beyond the critical threshold of 
multicollinearity. All correlation results are below 0.6 for each pair of variables, which 
indicates that multicollinearity is not a potential problem. 
The connections DCR and bank stability also presented. Applying statistical model, we 
obtain the result of bank stability and the amount of capital charge required to cover the 
DCR. A positive relationship exists between DCR and bank stability.  
DCR is incorporated as an independent variable in the regression analysis as a proxy of 
bank risk. the positive sign means if the lower (higher) amount of capital charge required 
to cover the DCR, the lower (higher) bank stabilise their capital. In this vein, Cihak and Hesse 
(2010) and Toumi et.al (2011) point out that the greater the exposure of bank to high risk, 
bank stability would be lower. When the Islamic banks more absorb a proportion of losses 
normally borne by investment account holders under commercial pressure, the Islamic 
banks became less stabilize. 
 
The best model selection 
In this section, we use the three models: None effects, Fixed effects, and Random effects 
(See Table 3). A fixed effect model asks how heterogeneity from group and/or time affects 
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individual intercepts, while a random effect model hypothesizes error variance structures 
affected by group and/or time. 
Specifically, the F-test compares a fixed effect model and (pooled) OLS conduct a Chow 
test and then, the Hausman specification test compares fixed and random effect models. 
Whereas the Breusch Pagan LM test to detect the heteroskedasticity problem. 
Firstly, Chow test was conducted to choose between non effects or fixed effects model. 
The model in effect uses an F-test where the H0: None effects, versus H1: Fixed effects 
model. The result is that there is no structural break and reject the null hypothesis.  
To observe the importance of bank size on stability in Islamic banks, this paper present 
subdivide banks into all, large and small Islamic banks. It is most important because banks 
can improve their performance by expanding their resources within their existing business 
lines where they possess distinctive comparative advantages. The results separately for 
sub-samples of large Islamic banks (assets over RM 3,500,000 million) and small Islamic 
banks (all others). The same method has been used in previous research by Mercieca, 
Schaeck, and Wolfe (2007). In Malaysia, about 30 percent of the Islamic banks fall into the 
small bank category and about 70 percent of the Islamic banks fall into the large bank 
category. 
By inspecting the output (See Table 3), it can be seen that for 3 group categories (all, 
large and small Islamic banks) the p-value reported for the Chow test statistic is less than 
0.0001. A low p-value suggest that we are able to reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, we 
choose the fixed effect model. 
Secondly, the best model is selected based on the Hausman test. The test to choose 
between fixed effects or random effects model. Hausman test statistic is used to test the 
null hypothesis that the random effect model is correct. Given a model and data in Table 3 
which fixed effects estimation would be appropriate. In a fixed effects kind of case, the 
Hausman test is a test of H0: That random effect would be consistent and efficient, versus 
H1: That random effect would be inconsistent. 
Note that the test statistic model is reported to be chi-square with 2 degrees of 
freedom, and a p-value of 0.0001. Based on these results we would to reject the null 
hypothesis. We conclude that a fixed effect approach will be preferred.  
In Table 3 also shows the result heteroskedasticity problem. When we use the Breusch-
Pagan test that the null hypothesis is a constant variance. The output shown the p-value is 
0.3584, then we failed to reject the null and there is no problem of heteroskedasticity. 
Based on the output, our results show that fixed effect model is better than none effect 
and random effect model. In addition, we adopt the approach by Baltagi (1995) who 
suggest that a random effects model is not appropriate if the sample is not randomly taken 





We can conclude that, basically the Displaced Commercial Risk problem should not 
occur in the Islamic banking system if their account holders choose Islamic banks due to 
religious obligatory factor. However, the empirical data proven the existing of DCR in 
Islamic banking system in Malaysia because of a customer that behaves profit motivated or 
often referred to as a floating client. 
To prevent a migration of the deposits, Islamic bank will pay the deficit using its own 
fund. This will decline total earning of the bank. Furthermore, we use displaced commercial 
risk as an indicator of stability. This paper using Z-score method to assess the stability of 
Islamic banks across the bank characteristics and macroeconomic variables. We find that, 
based on the output regression, the effect of DCR is still small. However Islamic bank 
needed to be protected from this unique risk (DCR).  
Why this issue is important because this study focus on demonstrating of the VaR 
approach to quantify DCR for Islamic banking institutions in Malaysia where have 
implement the dual banking system. The results also show the variations on DCR across the 
bank’s stability between of three size groups Islamic banks (all, large and small categories). 
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Figure 1: The Capital Required by Banks to Protect DCR 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistic variables 
Variables  Mean Median  Std. Dev. Skewness  Kurtosis  Jarque-Bera 
Z 0.6664 0.8236 0.4897 -0.2679 1.8508 21.6376* 
ROA 0.0149 0.0142 0.0133 0.9050 4.7920 87.3101* 
AST 0.3824 0.1046 0.8141 3.4953 16.3708 3063.7550* 
OWN 0.6471 1.0000 0.4786 -0.6155 1.3788 55.7643* 
LOAST 0.3578 0.3913 0.2847 0.0278 1.6804 23.4783* 
LPLO 0.0240 0.0162 0.0274 1.1523 3.3198 72.8515* 
DIV 0.3979 0.3319 0.3506 0.3721 2.2487 15.0521* 
COST 0.6263 0.0000 3.9118 -0.7313 11.2019 934.1464* 
EXCH 0.0661 0.0159 0.1066 2.3222 8.1410 646.0145* 
INFL 2.7253 2.7300 1.3055 0.4082 2.4659 12.8094* 
GDP 0.0934 0.1106 0.0667 -0.9825 3.1517 52.2744* 
INT 4.0847 3.2000 1.8131 1.2713 3.2412 87.7949* 
DCR 2.4100 0.6148 2.7979 0.7038 1.9915 40.3536* 
HERFIN 7.5224 9.3151 4.8324 -0.6091 2.0863 31.2036* 





Table 2: Pearson’s Correlations 
Correlation Z ROA AST OWN LOAST LPLO DIV COST EXCH INFL GDP INT DCR HERFIN 
Z 1.0000              
ROA 0.4560*** 1.0000             
AST 0.2857*** 0.0064 1.0000            
OWN 0.0287 0.1410*** -0.0068 1.0000           
LOAST 0.6635*** 0.5387*** 0.0361 0.2590*** 1.0000          
LPLO 0.4032*** 0.3938*** 0.1009** 0.2575*** 0.4478*** 1.0000         
DIV 0.5106*** 0.4265*** 0.0739* 0.0550 0.4855*** 0.3274*** 1.0000        
COST 0.0451 0.0427 0.2273*** 0.0035 -0.0232 0.1166*** 0.1524*** 1.0000       
EXCH 0.1015** 0.1407*** 0.1162*** 0.0000 0.1320*** -0.0040 0.0585 -0.0045 1.0000      
INFL -0.1677*** 0.0020 -0.0078 0.0000 -0.0471 -0.0921* -0.0663 0.0226 0.2798*** 1.0000     
GDP 0.0292 -0.0028 -0.0359 0.0000 0.0615 0.0161 0.0658 -0.0064 -0.0673 0.1938*** 1.0000    
INT -0.4449*** -0.1837*** -0.0060 0.0000 -0.3294*** -0.2678*** -0.3261*** -0.0686 0.5293*** 0.4504*** 0.0721* 1.0000   
DCR 0.5417*** 0.4186*** 0.0080 0.0314 0.5620*** 0.2751*** 0.5258*** 0.1544*** 0.0902* 0.0299 0.0526 -0.4666*** 1.0000  
HERFIN 0.7332*** 0.5483*** 0.1859*** 0.2245*** 0.6671*** 0.4266*** 0.6435*** 0.0695 0.0685 -0.1028** 0.0619 -0.4456*** 0.5709*** 1.0000 
 
Note: *** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
           ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 3: None, Fixed and Random Effects Estimation Result 
 
  GLS WITH NONE EFFECTS GLS WITH FIXED EFFECTS GLS WITH RANDOM EFFECTS 
  ALL LARGE SMALL  ALL LARGE SMALL  ALL LARGE SMALL  
C 0.3969 0.2569 0.8105 0.3439 0.2389 0.7126 0.4113 0.2569 0.8105 
  (0.0735)*** (0.0765)*** (0.1724)*** (0.0763)*** (0.0834)*** (0.1722)*** (0.0762)*** (0.0790)*** (0.1724)*** 
S 0.5481 -5.7568 1.7904 -1.8437 -6.9817 1.1604 -0.2791 -5.7568 1.7904 
  (1.5153) (2.0951)*** (2.4041) (1.6691) (2.4401)*** (2.5327) (1.5568) (2.1626)*** (2.4041) 
AST 0.1160 0.1034 0.0653 0.1016 0.1106 0.0641 0.1106 0.1034 0.0653 
  (0.0207)*** (0.0255)*** (0.0336)** (0.0212)*** (0.0272)*** (0.0341)** (0.0207)*** (0.0263)*** (0.0336)** 
OWN 0.1556 0.0571 0.1836 n.a n.a n.a 0.1526 0.0571 0.1836 
  (0.0356)*** (0.0455) (0.0598)*** n.a n.a n.a (0.0446)*** (0.0469) (0.0598)*** 
LOAST -0.5210 -0.6031 -0.4372 -0.5463 -0.7085 -0.5322 -0.5330 -0.6031 -0.4372 
  (0.0843)*** (0.0969)*** (0.1721)*** (0.0960)*** (0.1203)*** (0.1845)*** (0.0876)*** (0.1001)*** (0.1721)*** 
LPLO -1.0691 -0.5427 -2.4532 -0.5737 -0.0652 -2.9741 -0.8835 -0.5427 -2.4532 
  (0.6824)* (0.7149) (1.6766)* (0.7082) (0.7655) (1.7474)* (0.6865)* (0.7379) (1.6766)* 
DIV 0.0015 0.0470 0.1732 0.0109 0.0643 0.2084 0.0044 0.0470 0.1732 
  (0.0615) (0.0743) (0.1054)* (0.0688) (0.0865) (0.1191)* (0.0636) (0.0767) (0.1054)* 
COST -0.0054 -0.0033 -0.0004 -0.0045 -0.0036 -0.0002 -0.0051 -0.0033 -0.0004 
  (0.0043) (0.0059) (0.0058) (0.0042) (0.0062) (0.0058) (0.0042) (0.0061) (0.0058) 
DCR 0.5235 0.2012 1.6551 0.6084 0.1830 1.6533 0.5525 0.2012 1.6551 
  (0.2087)*** (0.2262) (0.4091)*** (0.2079)*** (0.2367) (0.4127)*** (0.2063)*** (0.2335) (0.4091)*** 
EXCH -0.0268 -0.0341 -0.0041 -0.0259 -0.0339 -0.0079 -0.0264 -0.0341 -0.0041 
  (0.0143)** (0.0159)*** (0.0270) (0.0140)** (0.0164)** (0.0272) (0.0141)** (0.0164)*** (0.0270) 
INFL 0.1707 0.0093 0.4498 0.1711 0.0183 0.4201 0.1700 0.0093 0.4498 
  (0.2464) (0.2686) (0.4443) (0.2406) (0.2765) (0.4466) (0.2419) (0.2773) (0.4443) 
GDP -0.0441 -0.0281 -0.1090 -0.0492 -0.0305 -0.1013 -0.0459 -0.0281 -0.1090 
  (0.0157)*** (0.0168)* (0.0325)*** (0.0157)*** (0.0175)* (0.0331)*** (0.0156)*** (0.0174)* (0.0325)*** 
INT -0.0103 -0.0143 -0.0069 -0.0109 -0.0170 -0.0091 -0.0103 -0.0143 -0.0069 
  (0.0086) (0.0091)* (0.0172) (0.0086) (0.0099)* (0.0177) (0.0085) (0.0094)* (0.0172) 
HERFIN 0.0382 0.0468 0.0250 0.0397 0.0423 0.0240 0.0387 0.0468 0.0250 
  (0.0057)*** (0.0067)*** (0.0105)*** (0.0060)*** (0.0075)*** (0.0107)*** (0.0057)*** (0.0069)*** (0.0105)*** 
R2  0.4580  0.6836 0.5311 0.6601 0.7312 0.6319 0.6844 0.7357 0.6760 
Hausman Test Random effect vs Fixed effect                                             9.97 
Prob                                                                                                              0.0001                              
Breusch-P Test the Heteroskedasticity problem                                                     12.55                      
Prob                                                                                                              0.3584 
Chow test Test None effect vs Fixed effect                                                           7.43 
Prob                                                                                                              0.0000 
Note: 
Figures in parentheses denote ‘Standard Error’ values of the regressions coefficients. 
*** Significant at 1 percent level. 
** Significant at 5 percent level. 
* Significant at 10 percent level. 
 
